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Nontariff barriers (NTBs) refer to the wide range of policy interventions other than 
border tariffs that affect trade of goods, services, and factors of production. Most 
taxonomies of NTBs include market-specific trade and domestic policies affecting trade 
in that market. Extended taxonomies include macro-economic policies affecting trade. 
NTBs have gained importance as tariff levels have been reduced worldwide. Common 
measures of NTBs include tariff-equivalents of the NTB policy or policies and count and 
frequency measures of NTBs. These NTB measures are subsequently used in various 
trade models, including gravity equations, to assess trade and/or welfare effects of the 
measured NTBs. 
 
Keywords: externality and trade, nontariff barrier, NTB, protectionism, sanitary and 
phytosanitary, SPS, standards, TBT, technical barrier to trade.    1
Nontariff Barriers 
This short paper provides a definition of nontariff barriers (NTBs) and a general NTB 
taxonomy. It reviews recent trends in the structure of trade barriers and then describes 
common approaches used to measure NTBs and their effects. NTBs refer to the wide and 
heterogeneous range of policy interventions other than border tariffs that affect and 
distort trade of goods, services, and factors of production. Common taxonomies of NTBs 
include market-specific trade and domestic policies such as import quotas, voluntary 
export restraints, restrictive state-trading interventions, export subsidies, countervailing 
duties, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) policies, rules of 
origin, and domestic content requirement schemes. Extended taxonomies also include 
macro-policies affecting trade. No taxonomy can be complete, as NTBs are defined as 
what they are not (Deardorff and Stern, 1998). This Palgrave entry on NTBs is 
complemented by related entries on anti-dumping, border effects, countertrade, gravity 
equation, quotas and tariffs, and trade costs.  
A taxonomy of NTBs 
Deardorff and Stern (1998) suggest the following taxonomy with five categories. A first 
broad category covers quantitative NTBs and similar restrictions. It includes import 
quotas and their administration methods (licensing, auctions, and other); export 
limitations and bans; voluntary export restraints, a limit on imports but managed by 
exporters; foreign exchange controls often based on licensing; prohibitions such as 
embargos; domestic content and mixing requirements forcing the use of local 
components in a final product; discriminatory preferential trading agreements and rules 
of origin; and countertrade, such as barter and payments in kind.   2
  A second category covers fees other than tariffs and associated policies affecting 
imports. This category includes variable levies triggered once prices reach a threshold or 
target level; advanced deposit requirements on imports, anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties imposed on landing goods allegedly exported “below cost” or with the help of 
export subsidies provided by foreign governments; and border tax adjustment such as 
value-added taxes potentially imposed asymmetrically on imported and domestic 
competing goods.  
  A third category is extensive. It collects various forms of government policies, 
including a wide set of macro-economic policies. This category covers direct 
governmental participation and restrictive practices in trade, such as state-trading and 
state-sponsored monopoly and monopsony; government procurement polices with 
domestic preferences; and industrial policy favoring domestic firms with associated 
subsidies and aids. In addition, the category extends to macro-economic and foreign 
exchange policies; competition policies; foreign direct investment policies; national 
taxation and social security policies; and immigration policies. Where to draw on the 
NTB definition is context-dependent.  
  Two better-targeted categories deal with customs procedure and administrative 
practices, and technical barriers to trade, which are central to NTBs. The former covers 
custom valuation methods that may depart from the actual import valuation; customs 
classification procedures other than the international harmonized system of classification 
to levy further fees; and customs clearance procedures, such as inspections and 
documentation creating trading cost. Technical barriers to trade (TBT) relate to health, 
sanitary, animal welfare, and environmental regulations; quality standards; safety and   3
industrial standards; packaging and labeling regulations and other media/advertising 
regulations. 
Recent trend in trade barriers 
Except export subsidies and quotas, NTBs have become more prominent relative to 
tariffs. Tariffs on manufacturing goods have been reduced to low levels through eight 
successive rounds of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its predecessor, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As of 2005, the unweighted average 
tariff is roughly 3% in high-income countries, and 11% in developing countries according 
to the World Bank, from respective levels at least three times as high in 1980. Export 
subsidies have almost disappeared except in a few agri-food markets. Quotas have 
become less important, as they have been converted into two-tier tariff schemes, the so-
called tariff-rate quotas. As tariffs have been lowered, demands for protectionism have 
induced new NTBs, such as TBT interventions. The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD, 2005) estimates that the use of NTBs based on quantity 
and price controls and finance measures has decreased dramatically, from a little less than 
45% of  tariff lines faced by NTBs in 1994 to 15% in 2004, reflecting commitments made 
during the Uruguay Round. However, the use of NTBs other than quantity and price 
controls and finance measures increased from 55% of all NTB measures in 1994 to 85% 
in 2004. The use of TBT almost doubled, from 32% to 59% of affected tariff lines during 
the same period. The use of quantity control measures associated with TBT showed a 
small increase, from 21% to 24% of affected tariff lines, suggesting that trade 
impediments within TBT are rising. Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2006) compute a 9% 
tariff equivalent of NTBs, including price and quantity controls, finance measures, and   4
TBT on average for all goods. The average tariff equivalent is about 40% for the goods 
affected by these NTBs. 
  Increased consumer demand for safety and environment-friendly attributes have 
also translated into an increase in the number of TBT. Many NTBs are regulated by the 
WTO agreements that came out of the Uruguay Round (the TBT Agreement, SPS 
Measures Agreement, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing) and articles of the 
original GATT, among others. NTBs in service industries have recently become more 
important as trade in services has been expanding. (Dee and Ferrantino, 2005) 
  Most NTBs are intrinsically protectionist whenever they do not address market 
failures such as externalities and information asymmetries between consumers and 
producers of goods being traded. Safety standards and labeling requirements are 
examples of the latter case (Henson and Wilson, 2005). Some NTBs may restrict trade 
but improve welfare in the presence of negative externalities or informational 
asymmetries. Other NTBs can expand trade as they enhance demand and trade of a good 
through better information about the good or by enhancing the good’s characteristics. 
Whether an NTB is protectionist is sometimes difficult to identify in the presence of 
market failure. If an NTB is equal to the measure that a social planner would implement 
for domestic purposes (i.e., all firms are domestic firms or all agents belong to a single 
economy), the NTB is presumably nonprotectionist (Fisher and Serra, 2000).  
Common measurement approaches 
Measuring NTBs and their effects is a challenge, because of the heterogeneity of policy 
instruments and lack of systematic data. A unified approach to measuring NTBs does not 
exist. Most measurement methods start from a simple partial equilibrium approach   5
looking at a single commodity and attempt to develop a producer, consumer, or trade tax 
equivalent to the NTBs that explains by how much supply and/or demand or trade are 
affected by the policy intervention. Most NTB analyses implicitly rely on a framework 
that accounts for three economic effects: the regulatory protection effect providing rents 
to the domestic sector; the “supply shift” effect, which reflects the increased costs of 
enforcing compliance of the NTBs on foreign and sometime domestic suppliers; and the 
“demand-shift” effect, which takes into account the fact that a regulation may enhance 
demand with new information or by reducing an externality. 
  The measurement of an NTB is hard to disentangle from the measurements of its 
effects on market equilibrium and trade. Most NTB measures and analyses focus on the 
increase in the price of imports resulting from the NTB, the resulting import reduction, 
the change in the price responsiveness of the demand for imports, the variability of the 
effects of the NTB, and the welfare cost of the NTB (Deardorff and Stern, 1998; and Dee 
and Ferrantino, 2005). 
  Several NTBs based on a price intervention (e.g., export subsidies, countervailing 
duties) are a tax instrument. More complex NTBs can sometimes be represented by a set 
of taxes, such as in the case of a domestic content requirement (Vousden, 1990). These 
NTBs can be analyzed as these types of taxes. To develop a tax equivalent, a basis of 
equivalence has to be chosen (Vousden, 1990). The tax equivalent has to lead to an 
equivalent protection level (same profit under the tax equivalent or the NTB); a price 
increase equivalence (a price wedge); or a consumption, production, or trade equivalent. 
This choice of basis depends on the intended policy analysis.    6
  However, many NTBs do not easily translate into a tax-equivalent instrument. 
They require more sophisticated and indirect approaches to be measured and to quantify 
their effects on import volume, price, and welfare. Round-about approaches are also used 
because of lack of data on the direct implications of an NTB on the cost of production 
and consumer decisions (Beghin and Bureau, 2001). 
The price-wedge method  
The price-wedge method measures the impact of an NTB on the domestic price of a good 
in comparison to a reference price, often the border price of a comparable good. The aim 
of this method is to derive a tariff/tax equivalent to the NTB as previously discussed, and 
use the tariff/tax equivalent in further analysis that measures implications of the NTB on 
resource allocation in the given markets affected by the NTB. Deardorff and Stern (1998) 
provide price-wedge equivalent formulas for an extended coverage of NTBs. 
  Conceptually, the measure compares the domestic price that would prevail 
without the NTB to the domestic price prevailing in the presence of the NTB assuming 
the price paid to suppliers remains unchanged. However, these prices are practically 
unobservable. Implementations of the price-wedge measure of an NTB compare the 
domestic and foreign prices of comparable goods in the presence of the NTB accounting 
for tariffs, transportation costs, and other known and observed trading costs. Adjustments 
can be made to recover a price estimate that would prevail in the absence of the NTB, 
using observed levels of quantities and prices, and own-price elasticities of demand, 
supply, and imported goods.  
  The price-wedge method has several drawbacks. First, if several NTBs are jointly 
in place, the price-wedge measures the price effect of these policies without being   7
informative about their respective contributions or even their nature. Second, quality 
differences are hard to account for precisely, although they are a pivotal element of the 
price-wedge computation. The price-wedge estimate of an NTB is usually sensitive to the 
assumptions made on the substitution between the imported and domestic goods. This 
method also has some limitations in large empirical studies for which data are 
aggregated, resulting in loss of information on quality differences between import and 
domestic comparable goods. Finally, trading costs may be present but not accounted for, 
and the price-wedge method may falsely attribute these trading costs to an NTB. 
Inventory-based frequency measures  
These measures count the number or frequency of regulations and barriers present in a 
given market. They are used in both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the 
incidence of NTBs. Common measures include the number of regulations and policies, 
which can be further elaborated to indicators such as the number of pages of national 
regulations. Frequency of trade detentions at borders is also used, and so are survey-
based frequency and number of complaints reported by exporters for perceived 
discriminatory regulatory practices.  
  When implemented, quantitative estimates often rely on catalogues of technical 
barriers (identification and description) using datasets such as UNCTAD’s TRAINS 
dataset. Measures include simple frequency of occurrence of NTBs, frequency ratios for 
product categories subject to an NTB; and a coverage ratio based on the value of imports 
of products within a category subject to an NTB, expressed as a share of import value of 
the corresponding category. Relative measures can also be developed comparing the 
latter frequency measures in a given country with respect to accepted international norms   8
or best practices, for example, for SPS or food safety regulations. Alternatively, 
frequency measures can be compared across commodities or across countries to identify 
large deviations from average frequencies, flagging potential protectionist issues.  
  NTBs vary in importance across sectors and products. Even for a given NTB type, 
its effects may vary across products. A major drawback of the frequency measures is that 
a correlation between the number of NTBs and their effect on trade and welfare may be 
low in absolute value. International datasets on NTB inventories may also suffer from 
uneven reporting by countries and heterogeneous coverage of measures across countries 
and commodities. Survey-based measures focus on effective barriers rather than on just 
an NTB count. However, they may suffer from various reporting biases, as surveys and 
respondents are often motivated by mercantilism to facilitate exports by the responding 
exporters. 
  Frequency measures do not identify the trade restrictiveness of NTBs but can be 
used in gravity equations to identify the effects of NTBs on trade flows. When trying to 
quantify NTBs, an obvious technique is to consider the foregone trade that cannot be 
explained by tariffs and known trading costs. NTB frequency measures, or in certain 
cases the level of standards themselves, can help identify the trade effects of these NTBS. 
Provided there is enough variability across countries or over time in the measure (e.g., the 
level of toxic residues), they can explain the variation in trade flow not explained by 
other explanatory variables included in the gravity equation (e.g., respective incomes of 
trading countries, distance, tariff, and other variables measuring border effects).  
  Gravity-equation techniques attempt to measure the trade impact of NTBs, not 
their welfare impact, and may therefore ignore some of the beneficial effect of the   9
regulations that correct negative externalities but restrict trade. NTBs are appropriate if 
trade is the vector of negative externalities such as unsafe food imports or pest-infested 
imports. In addition, the direction of the effect of the “NTB” variable on trade flows in 
the regression is not constrained. It is possible to capture a trade or demand-enhancing 
effect of regulations and standards. This enhancement occurs when the NTB facilitates 
trade and induces consumers to consume more of a product, though the product’s price is 
higher because of the NTB. Such expansion through standards has been observed in 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) food trade (Disdier, 
Fontagné, and Minouni, 2006). 
Risk assessment approaches  
Risk assessment approaches combined with scientific knowledge can contribute to 
gauging a subset of NTBs, especially safety and SPS standards and regulations. These 
approaches can contribute to assessing the welfare effects and the potential protectionism 
of these types of NTBs. Scientific knowledge can determine if a regulation is science 
based or not, or if a risk simply does not exist or is negligible. This criterion is used by 
the WTO in its assessment of TBT and SPS regulations. Cost-benefit calculations 
combined with risk assessment provide expected cost and benefits of such types of NTBs. 
Risk-assessment measures provide an economic criterion to gauge the desirability of an 
NTB and its likely protectionist nature if externalities are small and if its costs greatly 
exceed its benefits in expected terms. The combined use of scientific knowledge and 
cost-benefit assessment of an NTB is a demanding process suitable for a detailed analysis 
of a specific case study rather than for large-scale multi-market analyses. Another   10
limitation of this approach is the partial knowledge of health, environmental, and other 
risks associated with trade and their economic significance.  
  NTB measures are an essential step in computing welfare effects of the NTBs. 
Beyond welfare effects, these measures are also useful for policy purposes. WTO 
disputes frequently arise alleging that some NTBs impede trade more than necessary to 
achieve some legitimate objective or that they are just protectionist. These NTB measures 
are used in the formal dispute process to estimate export market losses and price-
lowering effects of the incriminated policy.    11
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